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The Insufficiency of Honesty From a book
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A couple of years ago I began a university commencement address by telling
the audience that I was going to talk about integrity .The crowd broke
into applause. Applause! Just because they had heard the word "integrity":
that's how starved for it they were. They had no idea how I was using
the word, or what I was going to say about integrity, or, indeed, whether
I was for it or against it. But they knew they liked the idea of talking
about it. Very
well, let us consider this word "integrity." Integrity is like
the weather: everybody talks about it but nobody knows what to do about
it. Integrity is that stuff that we always want more of. Some say that
we need to return to the good old days when we had a lot more of it. Others
say that we as a nation have never really had enough of it. Hardly anybody
stops to explain exactly what we mean by it, or how we know it is a good
thing, or why everybody needs to have the same amount of it. Indeed, the
only trouble with integrity is that everybody who uses the word seems
to mean something slightly different. For instance, when I refer to integrity, do I mean simply "honesty"?
the answer is no; although honesty is a virtue of importance, it is a
different virtue from integrity .Let us, for simplicity, think of honesty
as not lying; and let us further accept Sissela Bok's definition of a
lie: "any intentionally deceptive message which is stated."
Plainly, one cannot have integrity without being honest (although
we shall see, the matter gets complicated), but one can certainly be honest
and yet have little integrity. When
I refer to integrity, I have something very specific in mind. Integrity,
as I will use the term requires three steps:
discerning what is right and what is wrong; acting on what you
have discerned, even at personal cost; and saying openly that you are
acting on your understanding of right and wrong. The first criterion captures
the idea that integrity requires a degree of moral reflectiveness. The
second brings in the ideal of a person of integrity as steadfast, a quality
that includes keeping one's commitments. The third reminds us that a person
of integrity can be trusted. The
first point to understand about the difference between honesty and integrity
is that a person may be entirely honest without ever engaging in the hard
work of discernment that integrity requires.; she may tell us quite truthfully
what she believes without ever taking the time to figure out whether what
she believes is good and right and true. The problem may be as simple
as someone's foolishly saying something that hurts a friend's feelings;
a few moments of thought would have revealed the1ikelihood of the hurt
and the lack of necessity for the comment. Or the problem may be more
complex, as when a man who was raised from birth in a society that preaches
racism states his belief in one race's inferiority as a fact, without
ever really considering that perhaps this deeply held view is wrong. Certainly
the racist is being honest-he is telling us what he actually thinks- but
his honesty does not add up to integrity. TELLING EVERYTHING YOU KNOW Consider an example. A man who has been married for fifty years confesses
to his wife on his deathbed that he was unfaithful thirty-five years earlier.
The dishonesty was killing his spirit, he says. Now he has cleared his
conscience and is able to die in peace. The husband has been honest-sort of. He has certainly unburdened himself.
And he has probably made his wife (soon to be his widow) quite miserable
in the process, because even if she forgives him, she will not be able
to remember him with quite the vivid image of love and loyalty that she
had hoped for. Arranging his own emotional affairs to ease his transition
to death, he has shifted to his wife the burden of confusion and pain,
perhaps for the rest of her life. Moreover, he has attempted his honesty
at the one time in his life when it carries no risk; acting in accordance
with what you think is right and risking no loss in the process is a rather
thin and unadmirable form of honesty. Besides,
even though the husband has been honest in a sense, he has now twice been
unfaithful to his wife: once thirty-five years ago, when he had his affair
and again when, nearing death, he decided that his own (peace
of mind as more important an hers. In trying to be honest he has violated
his marriage vow by acting tow d his wife not with love but with naked
and perhaps even cruel self-interest. As
my mother used to say, you don't have to tell people everything you know.
Lying and nondisclosure, as the law often recognizes, are not the same
thing. Sometimes it is actually illegal to tell what you know, as, for
example, in the disclosure of certain financial information by market
insiders. Or it may be unethical, as when a lawyer reveals a confidence
entrusted to her by a client. It may be simple bad manners, as in the
case of a gratuitous comment to a colleague on his or her attire. And
it may be subject to religious punishment, as when a Roman Catholic priest
breaks the seal of the confessional-an offense that carries automatic
ex- communication. In all the cases just mentioned, the problem with
telling everything you know is that somebody else is harmed. Harm may
not be the intention, but it is certainly the effect. Honesty is most
laudable when we risk ourselves; it becomes a good deal less so if we
instead risk harm to others when there is no gain to anyone other than
ourselves. Integrity may counsel keeping our secrets in order to spare
the feelings of others. Sometimes, as in the example of the wayward husband,
the reason we want to tell what we know is precisely to shift our pain
onto somebody else-a course of action dictated less by integrity than
by self-interest. Fortunately, integrity and self-interest often coincide,
as when a politician of integrity is rewarded with our votes. But often
they do not, and it is at those moments that our integrity is truly tested. Consider
this example. Having been taught all his life that women are not as smart
as men, a manager gives the women on his staff less- challenging assignments
than he gives the men. He does this, he believes, for their own benefit:
he does not want them to fail, and he believes that they will if he gives
them tougher assignments. Moreover, when one of the women on his staff
does poor work, he does not berate her as harshly as he would a man, because
he expects nothing more. And he claims to be acting with integrity because
he is acting according to his own deepest beliefs. The
manager fails the most basic test of integrity. The question is not whether
his actions are consistent with what he most deeply believes but
whether he has done the hard work of discerning whether what he most deeply
believes is right. The manager has not taken this harder step. Moreover,
even within the universe that the manager has constructed 1 for himself,
he is not acting with integrity. Although he is obviously wrong to think
that the women on his staff are not as good as the men, even were he right,
that would not justify applying different standards to their work. By
so doing he betrays both his obligation to the institution that employs
him and his duty as a manger to evaluate his employees. The problem that the manager faces is an enormous one in our practical
politics, where having the dialogue that makes democracy work can seem
impossible because of our tendency to cling to our views even when we
have not examined them. As Jean Bethke Elshtain has said, borrowing from
John Courtney Murray, our politics are so fractured and contentious that
we often cannot reach disagreement. Our refusal to look closely at our
own most cherished principles is surely a large part of the reason. Socrates
thought the unexamined life not worth living. But the unhappy truth is
that few of us actually have the time or cons ant reflection on our views-on
public or private morality. Examine them we must, however, or we will
never know whether we might be wrong. None of this should be taken to mean that integrity as I have de- scribed
it presupposes a single correct truth. If, for example, your integrity-guided
search tells you that affirmative action is wrong, and my integrity-guided
search tells me that affirmative action is right, we need not conclude
that one of us lacks integrity. As it happens, I believe--both as a Christian
and as a secular citizen who struggles toward moral understanding--that
we can find true and sound answers to our moral questions. But
I do not pretend to have found very many of them, nor is an exposition
of them my purpose here. It is the case not that there aren't any right answers but that, given
human fallibility, we need to be careful in assuming that we have found
them. However, today's political talk about how it is wrong for the government
to impose one person's morality on somebody else is just mind- less chatter.
Every law imposes one person's morality on somebody else, because
law has only two functions: to tell people to do what they would rather
not or to forbid them to do what they would. And if the surveys can be believed, there is far more moral agreement in
America than we sometimes allow ourselves to think. One of the reasons
that character education for young people makes so much sense to so many
people is precisely that there seems to be a core set of moral understandings-we
might call them the American Core-that most of us accept. Some of the
virtues in this American Core are, one hopes, relatively noncontroversial.
About 500 American communities have signed on to Michael Josephson's program
to emphasize the "six pillars" of good character: trustworthiness,
respect, responsibility, caring, fairness, and citizenship. These virtues
might lead to a similarly noncontroversial set of political values: having
an honest regard for ourselves and others, protecting freedom of thought
and religious belief, and refusing to steal or
murder. Honesty AND COMPETING RESPONSIBILITIES Consider an example. Before engaging in sex with a woman, her lover tells
her that if she gets pregnant, it is her problem, not his. She says that
she understands. In due course she does wind up pregnant. If we believe,
as I hope we do, that the man would ordinarily have a moral responsibility
toward both the child he will have helped to bring into the world and
the child's mother, then his honest statement of what he in- tends does
not spare him that responsibility. This vision of responsibility assumes that not all moral obligations stem
from consent or from a stated intention. The linking of obligations to
promises is a rather modern and perhaps uniquely Western way of looking
at life, and perhaps a luxury that the well-to-do can afford. As Fred
and Shulamit Korn (a philosopher and an anthropologist) have pointed out,
"If one looks at ethnographic accounts of other societies, one finds
that, while obligations everywhere playa crucial role in social life,
promising is not preeminent among the sources of obligation and is not
even mentioned by most anthropologists." The Korns have made a study
of Tonga, where promises are virtually unknown but the social order is
remarkably stable. If life without any promises seems extreme, we Americans
sometimes go too far the other way, parsing not only our contracts but
even out marriage vows in order to discover the absolute; minimum obligation
that we have to others as a result of our promises. That some societies in the world have worked out evidently functional structures
of obligation without the need for promise or consent does not tell us
what we should do. But it serves as a reminder of the basic proposition
that our existence in civil society creates a set of mutual responsibilities
that philosophers used to capture in the fiction of the social contract.
Nowadays, here in America, people seem to spend their time thinking of
even cleverer ways to avoid their obligations, instead of doing what integrity
commands and fulfilling them. And all too often honesty is their excuse.
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